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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 16462 
EUGENE L. ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON, 
Defendant-Repondent. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff-appellant Sugarhouse Finance Company replies 
to the brief of respondents: 
POINT I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION AND MEETING OF THE MINDS. 
Respondents in their brief acknowledge the rule per-
taining to accord and satisfaction that "an agreement by a 
creditor to accept part payment of the liquidated debt as pay-
ment in full does not discharge the whole debt unless it is 
supported by a new and additional consideration." (Brief of 
Respondent, page 5.) Respondents rely upon FMA Financial Corp. 
v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) and Tates, 
Inc. v Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), 
to support their contention that the acknowledged rule should 
not be applied to the facts of this case. The contention is 
not supported by the cases cited nor the facts of this case. 
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
First, this court in both FMA and Tates held that 
there was not an accord and satisfaction. In ~, this Court 
reversed the trial court's finding of accord and satisfaction. 
Second, the particular facts of each case may be considered, 
but new consideration for an agreement to accept a lesser 
amount must be found. In FMA this Court stated: 
Courts are generally somewhat indulgent toward findi~ 
consideration somewhere in the new arrangement, such 
as that it was to settle a dispute, or that there is 
some advantage to the creditor in accepting a lesser 
Amount, where the unreasoning adherence to the rule 
might result in inequity. (Footnote omitted.) 
In Tates, Inc., this Court stated: 
The proposition upon which the claimed accord and 
satisfaction appears to rest is that under the total 
circumstances described above, the plaintiff either 
knew, or should be deemed to have known, that the 
check was being offered in full satisfaction of the 
debt. But such a supposition is not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the rules set forth in the 
authorities hereinabove referred to: that to bind the 
plaintiff to a new contract, it must be made to appeu 
that it was clearly so understood and agreed. (Foot· 
note omitted.) 
There is no new consideration between Andersons and Sugarhouse 
Finance Company. 
Third, there must be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties. Eugene Anderson failed to disclose that he owned cer-
tain real property, the sale of which was eminent, from which 
he would receive $2,000 cash and retain a portion of the pro-
perty. The judgment lien of Sugarhouse Finance Company was ~e 
only lien upon the property. Because Anderson failed to dis-
close this information, there could be no meeting of the minds 
of the parties. Anderson's purpose in traveling to Salt Lake 
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City was to discuss the judgment with Sugarhouse's president 
and, based upon his financial condition, to settle the judg-
ment by paying a lesser amount. The financial condition of the 
Andersons was considered by Sugarhouse's president, but Ander-
son did not disclose the ownership of the property, its impend-
ing sale, nor the amount to be received by Anderson from the 
sale. The mutual basis of Anderson requesting, and Sugarhouse 
considering, a settlement of the judgment was the Andersons' 
financial condition. For there to be a meeting of the minds, 
in these circumstances, required Anderson to disclose to Sugar-
house the property and status of the transaction for its sale. 
Assuming, for purpose of argument only, that the 
Andersons' agreement or promise to pay $2,200 as full payment 
and satisfaction of the judgment was adequate consideration to 
support an agreement with Sugarhouse, in view of the Andersons' 
other indebtedness, it does not follow that the Andersons' 
ownership of the property and the inuninence of its sale can be 
disregarded. Respondents rely on their financial circum-
stances, and their agreement in view of those circumstances to 
pay $2,200, as the basis for a claim of new consideration. The 
very heart of the argument is that the financial circumstance 
is the basis for finding consideration. This underscores the 
importance and requirement of Andersons disclosing their full 
circumstances, particularly the ownership of property and its 
anticipated sale. 
The trial Court's findings clearly show that the 
plaintiff was not aware of all of the pertinent facts: 
(3) Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. At the time the defendant was served with 
supplemental order referred to in paragraph 2 hereof 
defendant was anticipating the closing of a sale of ' 
real property in which he had a one-half interest asa 
tenant-in-common, and from which defendant Eugene L. 
Anderson was to receive $2,000 after payment of the 
underlying indebtedness. 
7. Eugene L. Anderson knew that plaintiff's 
judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien upon all 
real property belonging to defendants or in which they 
had an interest in Sevier County. 
8. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disc~"' 
to president of plaintiff the fact that he had an in-
terest in the property, that the property had been 
sold, and that he was anticipating the closing of the 
sale of property and that defendant Eugene L. AnderMn 
was to receive the sum of $2,000 from the sale thereof., 
9. Defendants have no other judgments against 
them which are docketed as judgment liens against real• 
property owned by them in the County of Sevier, Utah. 
In view of (1) plaintiff's judgment, (2) the supple-
mental order of the Court which required Eugene L. Anderson to 
appear and answer concerning his property, (3) Anderson's 
ownership of property, (4) the anticipated sale of the pro-
perty, (5) the anticipated net proceeds from the sale, (6) 
plaintiff's judgment lien against the property, and (7) the 
absence of any other judgment lien against the property, the 
ownership of property by the Andersons and the pending sale 
thereof cannot be dismissed or disregarded as insignificant. 
Rather, the plaintiff was entitled to consider the Anderson's 
settlement proposal based on all of the material and relevant 
facts, not just those which Eugene L. Anderson wanted to di-
vulge. If plaintiff, with knowledge of all pertinent and rel~ 
vant facts, then decided to accept the settlement proposal, the 
Andersons might have an arguable position. However, in abnn~ 
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of such a state of facts, Sugarhouse was not obligated to pro-
ceed with the settlement agreement. 
The facts of this case do not warrant a finding of 
consideration. Further, there could be no binding agreement 
because there was no meeting of the minds of the parties as to 
the terms of the agreement. Rather, to so find would work a 
gross inequity against Sugarhouse which was given a state of 
facts by Anderson and relied thereon, when the facts were false 
or incomplete. 
POINT II. THE ALLEGED ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS NOT 
ENTERED INTO FAIRLY AND HONESTLY; SUGARHOUSE WAS ENTITLED 
TO RESCIND UPON DISCOVERY OF THE FACTS. 
The general rule of the obligation of fairness between 
the parties is stated as follows: 
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfac-
tion must have been consummated fairly and honestly; 
if procured by fraud, misrepresentation, duress, impo-
sition, overreaching, coercion or compulsion, it is 
voidable at the option and instance of the aggrieved 
party, and may be rescinded upon discovery of the 
facts, provided the aggrieved party acts promptly. 1 
Am.Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction, Section 24. 
There can be no question that Sugarhouse Finance Company acted 
promptly. The facts show that upon receiving information re-
garding the true state of affairs, the president of Sugarhouse 
Finance Company put the Anderson check in the mail and notified 
·Eugene L. Anderson of that action and the rejection of any 
agreement on the same day. Those actions took place within two 
days of the conversation between Anderson and Sugarhouse's 
president. 
(5) 
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As discussed in Point I, above, Eugene Anderson did 
not disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that he owned property and 
that he anticipated its sale, from which he would receive 
$2,000. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no finding of accord and satisfaction 
because (1) the payment of part of a debt does not discharge 
it, even if the judgment creditor agrees that it will do so, 
and (2) a contract of accord and satisfaction must have been 
consununated fairly and honestly; if procured by fraud or misre-
presentation, it is voidable at the option and instance of the 
aggrieved party and may be rescinded upon discovery of the 
facts. Where one party has superior means of ascertaining the 
facts relating to a settlement agreement and fails to disclose 
the true state of affairs to the other party, the lack of dis-
closure may be attributed as fraud and may constitute a basis 
for invalidating a compromise settlement. The undisputed facts 
of this case require reversal of the trial court. 
DATED this day of 
(6) 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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I hereby certify that on the~~ day of March, 1980, I 
served a copy of the attached Reply Brief by mailing two copies 
thereof in a securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the fol-
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